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Abstract: In explaining altruistic cooperation and punishment, the challenging riddle is how 
transcendental rules can emerge within the empirical world. Recent game-theoretical studies show that 
pool punishment, in particular second-order punishment, plays a key role in understanding the evolution 
of cooperation. Second-order pool punishment, however, is tautological in nature: the punishment system 
itself is caused by its own effects. The emergence of pool punishment poses a logical conundrum that to 
date has been overlooked in the study of the evolution of social norms and institutions. Here we tackle the 
issue by considering the interplay of (a) cognitive biases in reasoning and (b) Agamben’s notion of homo 
sacer (Agamben, G. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford Univ. Press), that is, a 
person who may be killed without legal consequence. Based on cognitive disposition of reversing the 
cause-and-effect relationship, then we propose a new system: preemptive punishment of homo sacers. 
This action can lead to retrospectively forming moral assessment in particular for second-order pool 
punishment. 
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Introduction 
 
Cooperation in collective actions such as extending 
mutual aid or providing public goods poses a 
challenging conundrum [2] that has attracted broad 
attention from various scientific disciplines from 
biology to the social sciences. Cooperation in 
collective action tends to be costly, and this in turn 
gives rise to the temptation to freeload on 
contributions of others (so-called free rider problem). 
This will lead to terminating voluntary cooperation 
among rational individuals or under Darwinian 
dynamics, unless other factors or mechanisms to 
support are involved.  
The prescription of selective incentives for 
encouraging contributors and/or deterring free riders 
is one of most studied resolutions of the free rider 
problem [2-4]. Clearly, it is the providing of selective 
incentives that itself tends to be costly and thus 
constitutes another public good. Those who freeload 
on others’ contributions to the incentive system are 
likely to emerge. This so-called “second-order” free 
rider problem has already been tackled by 
interdisciplinary studies [3,5-7].  
To date, game-theoretical studies on the evolution 
of cooperation have demonstrated that differences in 
the details of punishment systems can have a large 
effect on the evolutionary fate of human cooperation 
[8-10]. In particular the main differences are of (a) 
whether the decision making to punish is reactive or 
proactive and (b) whether the punishment of second-
order free riders is considered or not. 
 
Peer and pool punishments 
 
One representative type of punishment, peer 
punishment, is often inductively modeled, being 
typically described as, “Because you wronged me (or 
someone), I will punish you.” The evolution of peer 
punishment thus depends on initial conditions and an 
assessment of past behaviors and can be studied in 
line with direct reciprocity for iterated interactions 
[11] or indirect reciprocity for social networks with 
reputation or gossip media [12]. A voluntary punisher 
who imposes penalties on free riders extends a public 
good that contributes to relatively increase the utility 
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or fitness of all others. Considering that peer 
punishment is likely to incur risks of retaliation or 
counter punishment, such costly peer punishment will 
often lead to tempting people to free ride on others’ 
punishing efforts. This can pave the way for 
regression to the second-order punishment of free 
riders through peer punishers. The same logic applies 
to third-order punishment and so on [13].  
Even if the population state has achieved 100% 
cooperation by peer punishment, another problem 
occurs. The absence of first-order free riders will 
result in difficulties to discriminate punishers 
(second-order contributors) from non-punishers 
(second-order free riders). This then leads to no 
selection pressure and thus neutral drift between 
those second-order actions. By the neutral drift, the 
population can lose a substantial fraction of the 
punishers. This means that mutant first-order free 
riders will be able to invade the population more 
easily.  
Ironically, the goal of establishing cooperation can 
be well maintained by not completely eliminating 
free riders. Without appropriate management of 
mutant free riders, furthermore, a cascade of 
collapses of punishment systems may happen. As the 
aforementioned regression develops, the same logic 
applies between third-order contributors and free 
riders. The neutral drift breaks if both first-order and 
second-order free riders are present.   
As the group size grows, these problems may lead 
to participant conviction that the punishments are 
continuously necessary, that free riders are supposed 
to be somewhere in every interaction, and thus it 
becomes impossible to achieve an ideal state of 100% 
cooperators. 
Another representative type of punishment is pool 
punishment [6,9]. The type of pool punishment 
expected here is a prospective scheme that can be 
described as, “Free riders (no matter for what public 
good) are supposed to be somewhere and thus the 
system needs to punish free riders of public goods.” 
This is followed by, “Thus, one ought to contribute to 
such comprehensive punishment, or otherwise one 
would themselves be similarly punished.” In its 
standard model with public good games (PGGs), pool 
punishment is set in place before establishment of the 
PGG, and then each participant is offered the 
opportunity to contribute to a fund for establishing 
the pool punishment system [9]. It is also assumed 
that pool punishment becomes active if at least one 
player contributes to the fund; otherwise, the system 
will not be implemented, because of a lack of funds.  
Recent studies show that when considering 
punishment of second-order free riders, for those who 
fail to contribute to the fund, pool punishment 
becomes more effective than peer punishment in 
stabilizing a cooperative state and participants are 
more likely to prefer pool punishment over peer 
punishment [9,14-16]. 
 
Second-order pool punishment 
 
The essence of pool punishment is its prior 
commitment system and second-order punishment 
module. As long as the participants commit to pool 
punishment, it is not difficult to install a prospective 
mechanism, such as taking deposits and hostages and 
hiring a sheriff, to implement “first-order” 
punishment of free riders for the PGG. First-order 
punishment is based on the first-case-then-effect 
policy and can naturally be given legitimacy by 
traditional reciprocal justice. 
However, here we do not assume a prior social 
norm for legitimizing second-order punishment of 
free riders for the punishment fund. That is, in the 
first place, a conscious pool punisher is assumed to 
be present, but it is not that there is a common 
knowledge of an assessment rule for judging non-
contribution to pool punishment. As such, it would 
not be easy to lead participants to commit to the 
specific norm of pool punishment in which the 
second-order free riding is assessed as bad. 
This is to say that each participant is not supposed 
to transcendentally abide by the assessment rule. 
Therefore, when a participant makes a decision 
regarding contribution on the basis of a moral 
assessment by the system, its attempt seems to be 
tautology, because the moral assessment rule when 
once being committed by the participant is applicable 
to itself. Therefore, it is implied that pool punishment 
must have empirically originated, while (almost) all 
individuals are likely to recognize the pool 
punishment as if it has already been given a priori. 
 
Symmetry in thinking 
 
Here we recall moral assessment considered in 
indirect reciprocity [17]. Indirect reciprocity through 
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reputation is often described by using the helper’s 
reputation as follows, “If I have helped you, then I 
will have a good image, and then someone will help 
me” [18-22]. Although models of indirect reciprocity 
mostly lack the dynamics to address the recipient’s 
reputation, updating of the recipient’s reputation 
often happens in daily life. Assuming that “If you are 
bad, you will be punished” is true, this is described 
through the following reasoning, “You must have 
been bad, because someone has punished you and 
then you do not pay it back.” (That is, “You have 
been responsible (namely, ‘guilty’) for something 
that caused the punishment.”) 
This is the so-called fallacy of affirming the 
consequent, and such cognitive disposition of 
reversing the cause-and-effect relationship is called 
“symmetry bias,” a heuristic way to overcome the 
trade-off dilemma of exploration and exploitation of 
information [23]. This is a topic that has been 
explored by a great deal of studies since Kahneman 
and Tversky’s work [24,25]. For instance, if 
probabilities P(A) and P(B) of events A and B are 
given together with a conditional probability P(A|B), 
the reverse conditional probability P(B|A) must be 
calculated by Bayes’ theorem as P(B|A) = 
P(A|B)P(B)/P(A). However human beings tend to 
omit the base rate P(B)/P(A) in estimating the value 
of the conditional probability P(B|A) without 
following Bayes’ theorem. As a result they reach a 
wrong guess that P(B|A) = P(A|B) [26]. 
The symmetry bias has also been underlying our 
economy. Originally, a commodity C plays the role 
of money in a society because the values of other 
commodities in the society are measured contingently 
by the amount of C. However people gradually think 
that the commodity C has intrinsically the 
characteristic of money (thus other commodities can 
never play the role of money), and that therefore the 
values of other commodities are measured by the 
amount of C. This inversion of logic in the economic 
context is referred to as “commodity fetishism” of 
money by Karl Marx in the first chapter of his 
famous book “Capital: Critique of Political 
Economy” [27]. 
We assume that a similar cognitive error occurs in 
the context of indirect reciprocity. Previous models 
of indirect reciprocity through reputation have mostly 
assumed that a (bad or unknown) player is able to 
affect its reputation only after its own action. For our 
model of pool punishment we take the symmetry bias 
into consideration, which means that a punisher’s 
action can affect a punishee’s reputation and even 
make it up out of nothing. 
 
 
Homo sacer and preemptive punishment 
 
Taking into account the effects of symmetry bias on 
moral assessment, therefore, one of the remaining 
missing pieces would be to determine who is an 
appropriate target to be punished for inventing and 
legitimizing a moral rule, when in the presence of the 
whole group (“third party”). Referring to Masachi 
Ohsawa’s introduction and interpretation [28], let us 
apply Giorgio Agamben’s concept regarding a person 
called homo sacer [1] to our model. Homo sacer is 
described as someone excluded from the law itself, 
and anybody who has killed this person is acquitted 
of the charge for the killing. That is, homo sacer is an 
outlaw in its literal sense, like irregular migrants and 
stateless persons in modern societies. At the 
beginning of joint efforts, the innovative punisher, 
who is willing to continuously police would-be free 
riders, should actively punish a member like homo 
sacer. From the viewpoint of the law of fitness, 
changing things or even something transitory, a 
feature of homo sacer, seems to prefer more 
 
 
Fig. 1. Establishing moral assessment rules through 
preemptive sanctions. Player X sanctions player Y so that 
the resulting assessment rule leads observer Z to 
retrospectively assess the punisher X as good and the 
punishee Y as bad. If the punishee Y waives its claim of 
counter-punishment of the punisher X, then the 
retrospective system based on preemptive sanctions can 
be justified.  
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profitable things, and thus at least not committing to 
costly punishment.  
For this reason, the nature of homo sacer will work 
as a trigger of its preemptive sanction from the 
strictest and most costly, continuous punisher (X in 
Fig. 1). To a third party (Z in Fig. 1), there is no 
ground for understanding the badness other than the 
fact of homo sacer’s change and non-contribution. 
Considering the aforementioned symmetric bias, this 
can lead to faulty reasoning: “The target (Y in Fig. 1) 
deserves being punished, because its nature has been 
bad,” and “Possibly, therefore, changing (from 
‘contribution’) to non-contribution has been assessed 
as bad.” This may result in another faulty reasoning 
(so-called mutual exclusivity bias): “Contribution has 
been assessed as good, and from the beginning it 
ought to be that a man does not alter his 
contribution.” 
Of course, the cause of punishment of homo sacer is 
nonsense and s/he is innocent of anything (and thus 
in particular, of free riding) because initially there has 
been no norm for validity of non-contributing to the 
pool punishment and everyone has not acted (and 
thus paid) for it. To perfectly project the 
transcendental cognition of norms by preemptive 
sanction of homo sacer, subsequently, the fact of the 
existence of homo sacer should be eliminated. This 
means that it can be excluded twice because the 
nature of homo sacer has already been outside of both 
the law and courts [28]. 
Thus the ban on homo sacer leads to completion of 
the system’s consistency in pool punishment; that is, 
with a definition of goodness and badness. By 
rejecting homo sacer, which is a point of 
inconsistency, the resulting assessment rule can be 
viewed as being transcendental. Thus, the larger the 
number of individuals who are jointly included in 
attention to the ceremonial, preemptive punishment, 
the more the assessment rule may be spread over the 
population by support of the cognitive bias. This 
could resolve the coordination problem for pool 
punishment. 
 
Quicksand and scarecrow 
 
From what we discuss in this paper, one may recall 
a puzzle of rules and communication: forming 
consensus of a rule itself needs consensus of another 
rule in advance.  How can the infinite regression stop? 
How can the initial consensus of knowledge be 
coordinated? To better understand implication of the 
puzzle to our model, we refer to the example of the 
quicksand and the scarecrow by the analytic 
philosopher David Lewis [29]. With respect to the 
example, Bardsley and Sugden ([30], pp. 763-764) 
write, “Lewis (1969, p. 158) imagines coming across 
a patch of quick sand, waiting to warn others of the 
danger, but not knowing of any existing conventional 
signal. So: ‘I put a scarecrow up to its chest in the 
quicksand, hoping that whoever sees it will catch on.’ 
Although this signal does not yet have any 
conventional meaning, Lewis says, ‘I have done my 
part of a signaling system in a signaling problem; and 
I hope my future audience will do its part’. This 
example seems to establish that an agent could mean 
something by his placement of the scarecrow without 
its having a prior use in any community. This 
meaning seems to be established by the agent’s 
intention, and appears to be responsible for its later 
taking on a conventional meaning, that half-
submerged scarecrows stand for quicksand.” 
Considering Lewis’s images in line with our model, 
it looks like that the person who warned others of 
danger corresponds to the innovative punisher (who 
initially exemplifies punishment prior to joint efforts). 
And, the homo-sacer-like punishee who suggests the 
existence of a moral rule could be viewed as the half-
submerged scarecrow which stands for quicksand. 
This is because homo sacer, who has less identity, is 
so extremely passive in asserting its own right, like 
the scarecrow that was at the mercy of the signaler. In 
the case of quicksand, the scarecrow may have had 
been possessed by the signaler or like a stone on the 
wayside that anybody may pick up, and thus, was 
able to be disposed of into the quicksand as the 
signaler liked. Similarly, homo sacer seems to be a 
private and nighest thing.  
Let us get back to what we discussed about the 
repeated regression of peer punishment in the early 
section. From the nature of peer punishment, it is 
understood that the higher the order of the punisher, 
the more difficult it is to discriminate the punisher 
from those who almost always contribute to public 
goods but free ride only on the last order of 
punishment. Therefore, the degree of ambiguity of 
higher-order free riders will reach the limit when 
considering the infinite regression of peer 
punishment. There is only a very fine line between 
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the resulting punisher and punishee. In that case both 
are able to transform to each other by only very 
minor changes. This implies that the continuous peer 
punisher could almost be itself its punishee, who is 
viewed as homo sacer for the preemptive sanction. 
That is, the system of peer punishment will be 
rejected by itself in the limit of regression. However, 
this failure means nothing other than the path to 
success in establishing the moral assessment for pool 
punishment.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Our discussion has been extended from featuring the 
characteristics of peer and pool punishments to 
exploring how the transition between those 
punishment can emerge. Our conjecture is that the 
creation of a moral assessment rule for pool 
punishment needs to exclude contingency or 
transitoriness, often described as mutation or 
exploration which is one of the fundamental 
principles of evolution. The discussion potentially 
provides a new insight into the evolutionary process.  
Those who survive in a competitive world governed 
by the law of fitness should have something 
transitory at a greater or lesser degree. In the sense, it 
is maybe that we ourselves could be homo sacer 
which can represent uncertainty of our evolving life 
and that for making moral judgment, we need the 
option of cutting off the changeable homo-sacer part 
from the whole. This will leave behind the other, 
unchangeable “zealous” part, which is not interested 
in maximizing fitness [31] and is capable of 
controlling our normative life by means of pool 
punishment.  
By excluding evolvability such as mutation and 
exploration, a cooperative punisher can opt out of the 
competitive games of life. That is, the zealous 
punisher will be viewed as a kind of environmental 
parameter to stabilize sanctions in the evolutionary 
game. This is the “second-order” optional 
participation, which is a meta level of the original, 
first-order optional participation: to opt out of 
particular joint efforts, while instead relying on a 
small payoff independent of what others do [32]. To 
better model and analyze the evolution of social 
norms, therefore, it would be fascinating to 
collaborate with previous studies on evolving 
mutation rates [33] and excludable public good 
games [34,35]. 
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